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Abstract
Using an aggregate two-periods overlapping generations model with endogenous labor, con-
sumption in both periods of life, homothetic preferences and productive external e¤ects [Lloyd-
Braga et al., 2007. Indeterminacy in dynamic models: When Diamond meets Ramsey. Journal
of Economic Theory 134, 513-536], we examine the e¤ects of alternative government nancing
methods on the range of values of increasing returns leading to indeterminacy. We show that
under a large enough share of rst period consumption over the wage income, local indeterminacy
can easily occur for mild externalities if constant government expenditure is nanced through
either labor or capital income taxes. More precisely, we show that, with labor income taxes and
mild externalities, small government expenditures are helpful to local indeterminacy, while large
government expenditures are useful to stabilize the economy. With capital income taxes and mild
externalities, local indeterminacy always exists. Moreover, we explore how our previous results
are changed once government expenditure is endogenously determined for xed rates on labor
and capital income under the balanced-budget rule.
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1. Introduction
A large body of literature has suggested that local indeterminacy can arise in dynamic general equi-
librium models with market distortions. Since Benhabib and Farmer (1994), many authors have used
a one-sector Ramsey growth model augmented to include endogenous labor supply and productive
externalities to analyze the expectation-driven uctuations. They nd that local indeterminacy can
easily emerge with mild externalities, provided that the elasticity of capital-labor substitution, the
elasticity of intertemporal substitution in consumption and the elasticity of the labor supply are large
enough.1 Using the similar framework, Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (1997) nd that local indetermi-
nacy can easily occur for empirically plausible values of income tax rates due to the dynamic e¤ects
of scal policies. And they use numerical simulations to show their main results. Guo and Harrison
(2004) further show that indeterminacy can not appear once the government nances endogenous
government spending and transfer with constant tax rates.
Recent works extend the Diamond (1965) model by adding endogenous labor supply, external
e¤ects and/or scal policy into the overlapping generations framework. Following Reichlin (1986),
most of those works have focussed on a special case without rst period consumption (for instance,
Cazzavillan (2001) and Gokan (2009a, 2009b)). However, some other works consider a general
case where consumptions in both periods of life and endogenous labor supply exist (for instance,
Cazzavillan and Pintus (2004, 2006), Lloyd-Braga et al. (2007) and Chen and Zhang (2009a, 2009b)).
Cazzavillan and Pintus (2004, 2006) consider an OLG model with totally separable preferences over
both young and old consumptions and observe how the ratio of rst period consumption over the
1For a complete discussion on this issue, see Pintus (2006).
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wage income inuences local indeterminacy. Lloyd-Braga et al. (2007) consider an OLG model with
non-separable preferences over both young and old consumptions, and analyze the e¤ects of labor and
capital externalities in production on local indeterminacy. Chen and Zhang (2009a, 2009b) instead
explore the dynamic e¤ects of government scal policy in the very similar OLG models.
To our knowledge, Gokan (2009a) is the rst paper that studied how local dynamics are a¤ected
by changes in government expenditure, depending on the degree of productive externalities, within
an OLG framework. However, his study concentrates on the particular OLG model without rst
period consumption as studied in Cazzavillan (2001). He nds that as for consumption taxes, xed
tax rates are always recommended relative to endogenous tax rates. In contrast, as for capital
income taxes, the sizes of increasing returns are important in analyzing which budget policy is more
e¤ective for mitigating the extent to which aggregate activity uctuates. Our paper instead aims to
study how alternative government nancing methods inuence aggregate uctuations driven by self-
fullling prophecies in an extended OLG economy with labor and capital externalities in production,
as studied in Lloyd-Braga et al. (2007). We nd that provided that the share of rst period
consumption over the wage income is larger than 1/2, local indeterminacy of equilibria can easily
arise for mild externalities when constant government expenditure is nanced through either labor or
capital income taxes. In the case with labor income taxes, it is shown that for mild externalities, small
government expenditures are helpful to local indeterminacy, while large government expenditures are
useful to stabilize the economy. In the case with capital income taxes, local indeterminacy always
exists for mild externalities. In addition, we consider another kind of scal policy specication.
Suppose that government expenditures are endogenously determined for xed rates on labor and
capital income under a balanced-budget rule. We nd that the range of values of increasing returns
leading to local indeterminacy is independent of the constant tax rates on labor and capital income.
In contrast, Guo and Lansing (2002) nd that in a Ramsey model, constant tax rates on labor and
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capital income inuence the minimum levels of increasing returns leading to indeterminacy.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we set up the model. In Sections 3 and 4, we
study the cases with either labor or capital income taxes, and analyze how the size of government ex-
penditures inuences the local dynamics of the normalized steady state, depending on the magnitude
of increasing returns. In Section 5, we provide economic interpretations behind our indeterminacy
results. In Section 6, we consider another kind of scal policy in which tax rates on labor and capital
income are constant and government expenditures are endogenous. Section 7 concludes the paper.
2. The model
This paper introduces constant government expenditure nanced by either labor or capital income
taxes in a competitive, non-monetary, overlapping generations model with production externalities as
studied in Lloyd-Braga, Nourry and Venditti (2007). Identical agents live for two periods, consume
in both periods (c when young, and bc when old). Each agent maximizes her lifetime utility
max
ct, lt,
^
ct+1
[u(ct;bct+1)  v (lt=B)] , (1)
subject to the constraints
ct + kt+1 = (1  wt)wtlt, (2)
bct+1 = 1   + (1   rt+1)rt+1 kt+1 (3)
ct  0, bct+1  0, L  lt  0, for all t  0,
where lt, ct and kt+1 are labor, consumption and saving (the amount of capital), respectively, of the
individual of the young generation, bct+1 is the consumption of the same individual when old. wt > 0
rt+1 > 0 are the real wage rate at time t and the marginal product of capital at time t+1. wt and
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 rt+1 2 (0; 1) are the tax rates levied on labor income and capital income respectively. B > 0 and
L > 0 denote a scaling parameter and the maximum amount of labor supply, respectively.
The preferences satisfy the following conditions as in Lloyd-Braga et al. (2007).
Assumption 1. (i) u(ct;bct+1) is Cr over R2+ for r large enough, increasing with respect to each
argument (u1(ct;bct+1) > 0, u2(ct;bct+1) > 0), concave and homogeneous of degree one over R2++.
Moreover, for all ct, bct+1 > 0, limbct+1=ct!0u1=u2 = 0 and limbct+1=ct!+1u1=u2 = +1, where u1=u2
stands for u1(1;
bct+1
ct
)=u2(1;
bct+1
ct
). (ii) v (lt=B) is Cr over [0; L=B] for r large enough, increasing
(v0 (lt=B) > 0) and convex (v" (lt=B) > 0) over (0; L=B). Moreover, limlt!0v0(lt=B) = 0 and
limlt!lv0(lt=B) = +1.
We introduce homogeneity in order to express the capital accumulation equation as a function
of the ratio between the young agents consumption and the after-tax wage income. The rst order
conditions of the agents optimization problem are stated as follows:
u1(1;
bct+1
ct
)
u2(1;
bct+1
ct
)
 g(bct+1
ct
) = eRt+1, (4)
u1(1;
bct+1
ct
) (1  wt)wt =
v0(lt=B)
B
, (5)
ct + bct+1= eRt+1 = (1  wt)wtlt, (6)
kt+1 = (1  wt)wtlt   ct, (7)
where eRt+1  1   +  1   rt+1 rt+1 is the after-tax real gross rate of return on capital stock.
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Since g0(bct+1ct ) > 0, we can derive that
bct+1
ct
= g 1( eRt+1)  h( eRt+1). (8)
Combining (4), (6), (8) with Eulers identity ctu(1;bct+1=ct)  ctu1(1;bct+1=ct)+bct+1u2(1;bct+1=ct),
we can get:
ct =
u1(1; h( eRt+1))
u(1; h( eRt+1)) (1  wt)wtlt  ( eRt+1) (1  wt)wtlt, (9)
where ( eR) 2 (0; 1) is the propensity to consume of the young, or equivalently the share of rst
period consumption over the after-tax wage income. Then, Eq. (7) becomes
kt+1 = (1  ( eRt+1)) (1  wt)wtlt. (10)
We can compute the elasticity of intertemporal substitution in consumption 
 eR and the elas-
ticity of the labor supply "l:

 eR = eR
g0

h( eR)h( eR) =  
"
u11(1; h( eR))
u1(1; h( eR)) + u22(1; h(
eR))
u2(1; h( eR)) h
 eR# 1 > 0, (11-1)
"l(lt=B) =
v0 (lt=B)
v00 (lt=B) (lt=B)
> 0. (11-2)
It is easy to have the identity 
 eR = 1=1 + h eR = eR, or eR=h eR =   eR =1    eR.
And the elasticity of the propensity to consume 
 eR is:
0
 eR eR

 eR =

1  
 eR1    eR . (12)
The saving function is then increasing with eR i¤   eR > 1. As in Lloyd-Braga et al. (2007), we
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assume gross substitutability, i.e.  > 1, in the rest of our paper.
On the production side, the perishable output yt is produced using capital kt and labor lt with a
Cobb-Douglas production function:
yt = Ak
a
t l
b
tK

t L

t , where a+ b = 1,  > 0,  > 0,
where A is a scaling parameter, Kt and Lt denote the average economy wide use of capital and labor,
which are taken as given by individual rms.  and  are the degrees of the external e¤ects derived
from the average economy wide use of capital and labor, respectively.2
Focusing on the symmetric equilibrium, we have that Kt = kt and Lt = lt. Therefore, the social
production function is yt = Akt l

t , where  = a+  and  = b+ . Then the real wage rate and the
marginal product of capital are given by
wt = bAk

t l
 1
t , (13)
rt = aAk
 1
t l

t . (14)
In the following analysis, we rule out the production technology associated with endogenous
growth.
Assumption 2.  6= 1.
The government nances its constant expenditures through either labor or capital income taxes,
wtwtlt +  rtrtkt = gt  g, (15)
where g > 0 is the constant government expenditure.
2The sources of capital and labor externalities are stated in Gokan (2008, p. 1653). Lloyd-Braga et al. (2007)
consider a Cobb Douglas production technology with externalities in Section 6.
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Hence, we can easily derive the intertemporal competitive equilibrium paths:
kt+1 = (1  ( eRt+1)) (1  wt)wtlt, (16-1)
v0(lt=B)=B = u1(1; h( eRt+1)) (1  wt)wt, (16-2)
where eRt+1 = 1   +  1   rt+1 rt+1, wt = bAkt l 1t , rt = aAk 1t lt , and wtwtlt +  rtrtkt = g.
3. Labor income tax nance
We assume total depreciation of capital in the rest of paper. In this section, we consider the case
in which government expenditures are nanced by labor income taxes, i.e.,  rt = 0, eRt+1 = rt+1 =
aAk 1t+1 l

t+1, and g = wtwtlt. Then, the intertemporal competitive equilibrium paths (kt; lt) can be
given by
kt+1 = (1  (rt+1))(wtlt   g), (17-1)
v0(lt=B)lt=B = u1(1; h(rt+1))(wtlt   g), (17-2)
where wt = bAkt l
 1
t and rt = aAk
 1
t l

t .
3.1. Steady state existence
From (17), a steady state is a pair
 
k; l

such that,
k =

1  (aAk 1l)

bAk

l
   g

, (18-1)
v0(l=B)l=B = u1(1; h(aAk
 1
l

))(bAk

l
   g). (18-2)
To ease the analysis, we consider a normalized steady state
 
k; l

= (1; 1). Following the procedure
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used in Lloyd-Braga et al. (2007), we use the scaling parameters A and B to give conditions for the
existence of the normalized steady state (NSS in the sequel).
Proposition 1. Under Assumptions 1-2, let V (B) = v0(1=B)=B. Then
 
k; l

= (1; 1) is a normalized
steady state of the dynamic system (17) if and only if limA!+1 (1  (aA)) (bA g) > 1. The scaling
parameters A, B are set at the levels A > 0, B > 0 that satisfy the following equations:
1 = (1  (aA)) (bA  g), (19-1)
B = V  1fu1[1; h(aA)](bA  g)g. (19-2)
Proof. It is similar to the proof of Proposition 1 in Chen and Zhang (2009b).
There may exist multiple steady states. However, for brevity, we just analyze the local dynamics
around the NSS. In the rest of this section we assume that the conditions of Proposition 1 hold in
order to ensure the existence of the NSS.
Assumption 3. limA!+1 (1  (aA)) (bA  g) > 1, A = A and B = B.
3.2. Local dynamics
We linearize the dynamical system (17) around the NSS and examine the local stability of the
linearized dynamic system. We can have the following proposition.
Proposition 2. The two-dimensional system (17) denes uniquely a local dynamics near the NSS
(k; l) = (1; 1). The linearized dynamics for the deviations dkt = kt   k, dlt = lt   l are determined
by the determinant DW and the trace TW of the Jacobian matrix. And the expressions of DW and
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TW are given by
DW =


1 + (1  ) g
1   , (20-1)
TW =
  [1 + (1  ) g]
1     
(1  ) (1  )  1
 (1  ) , (20-2)
where   1+"l"l > 1.
Proof. See Appendix 1.
Before we study the point (TW (g) ; DW (g)), we need gure out the range of the parameter g.
Since g = bAw and A =
1
b(1 )(1 w) (when  and b are xed), we have that g =
w
(1 )(1 w) . This
implies that g is an increasing function of w. As w varies in (0; 1), the range of g is (0;+1).
Depending on the degree of increasing returns to scale, local dynamics will be a¤ected by a change
in government expenditure. As in Gokan (2008), we will study how the trace and the determinant
of the Jacobian matrix vary in the (TW ; DW ) plane, when g increases.3 From (20), we can obtain
the following lemma.
Lemma 1. As the government expenditure varies in (0;+1), the point (TW (g) ; DW (g)) is then
dened by the following linear relationship W :
DW = SWTW + SW(1  ) (1  )  1
 (1  ) , (21)
3A simple way to analyze the local dynamics of the normalized steady state is to observe the variation of the trace
T and the determinant D in the (T;D) plane as some parameters are made vary continuously. In particular, we are
interested in the two roots of the characteristic polynomial Q() = 2   T +D. There is a local eigenvalue which is
equal to +1 when 1   T +D = 0. It is represented by the line (AC) in Fig. 1. Moreover, one eigenvalue is  1 when
1+T +D = 0. That is to say, in this case, (T;D) lies on the line (AB). Finally, the two roots are complex conjugate of
modulus 1, whenever (T;D) belongs to the segment [BC] which is dened by D = 1, jT j  2. Since both roots are zero
when both T and D are 0, then, by continuity, they have both a modulus less than one i¤ (T;D) lies in the interior
of the triangle ABC, which is dened by jT j < j1 +Dj, jDj < 1. The steady state is then locally indeterminate given
that there is a unique predeterminate variable Kt. If jT j > j1 +Dj, the stationary state is a saddle-point. Finally, in
the complementary region jT j < j1 +Dj; jDj > 1, the steady state is a source.
The diagram can also be used to study local bifurcations. When the point (T;D) crosses the interior of the segment
[BC], a Hopf bifurcation is expected to occur. If, instead, the point crosses the line (AB), one root goes through  1. In
that case, a ip bifurcation is expected to occur. Finally, when the point crosses the line (AC), one root goes through
+1, one expects an exchange of stability between the NSS and another steady state through a transcritical bifurcation.
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where the slope of W is SW =  1  < 0.
As g 2 (0;1), only a part of W is relevant (see Figure 1). To nd the location of W , we need
gure out the starting and end points of the pair (TW (g) ; DW (g)):
lim
g!1DW = +1, limg!1TW =  1,
D0  lim
g!0
DW =

 (1  ) > 0,
T 0  lim
g!0
TW =   
1   +
(   1) (1  ) + 1
 (1  ) .
In graphical terms, under Assumption 3, since DW (g) increases with g, the relevant part of W
describes a half-line which starts in
 
T 0; D0

for g = 0 and points upwards to the left as g increases
from 0 to +1. Since W points upward, a necessary condition for the existence of local indetermi-
nacy, i.e., for one part of (TW ; DW ) belonging to the interior of the triangle ABC, is that the starting
point
 
T 0; D0

lies in the interior of the triangle ABC. To ensure the necessary condition, we need
the following restrictions:
D0 < 1, (22-1)
D0 > T 0   1, and D0 >  T 0   1. (22-2)
To ease computations and focus on the empirically plausible values of those parameters, in the
rest of paper, we consider the case with small externalities and a signicant share of rst period
consumption over the wage income (). We assume that , , and  satisfy the following conditions.
Assumption 4.  < 1=2 < , and = > 1.
The assumption  < 1=2 <  is used as we consider the presence of small capital externalities
(see Benhabib and Farmer (1996, p. 434)) and a large enough share of rst period consumption over
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the wage income (see Lloyd-Braga et al. (2007, p. 529)). Note that the level of labor externalities
considered here is not large.4
Lemma 2. Under Assumptions 1-4, we nd that D0 < 1, the point
 
T 0; D0

belongs to the interior
of the triangle ABC, and
SW  < 1 if
1 <  <
1 + 

, 1 <


< min

1  

,
1
1  

. (23)
Proof. See Appendix 2.
In Lemma 2, the latter inequality implies that (1  ) = > 1, or  < 1   . Therefore, under
these conditions  < 1=2 <  < 1 , 1 <  < 1+ , and 1 <  < min
n
1 
 ,
1
1 
o
, the half-line W
will intersect the line BC and the line AB. A critical issue is to study the intersections of W with
the lines BC and AB. As shown in Proposition 3, these intersections may arise in two simple cases
depending on whether W crosses the interior of the segment BC or not.
In order to get the bifurcation values of g, we calculate the intersection points of the half-line
W with the line AB and the segment BC. First, as W crosses the line AB, the coordinate of the
intersection point is
DAB  DW

gflip

=
 SW
1 + SW

1 +


 (   1) (1  ) + 1
1  

, (24)
TAB  TW

gflip

=  DAB   1. (25)
As SW lies in ( 1; 0), we can show that DAB is larger or less than 1 depending on these parameter
values. When DAB > 1, case (1.1) will occur (see Figure 1). When DAB < 1, case (1.2) will occur
(see Figure 2). When the half-line W intersects the segment BC, we have DW
 
gHopf

= 1.
4For example, the level of labor externalities considered in Wen (1998, pp. 13,20)s simulations-that is, 0.11- falls
into this region.
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Simple algebra gives us these two bifurcation values: gHopf =
h
(1  )    1
i
= (1  ) and gflip =h
DAB (1  )    1
i
= (1  ). As a result, we can have the following proposition.
Proposition 3. Under Assumptions 1-4, when  < 1=2 <  < 1   , 1 <  < 1+ , and 1 <  <
min
n
1 
 ,
1
1 
o
, the following holds.
(1) Case 1.1: When DAB > 1, the steady state (1; 1) is a sink for g < gHopf , undergoes a Hopf
bifurcation at g = gHopf , becomes a source for gHopf < g < gflip, undergoes a ip bifurcation at
g = gflip, and becomes a saddle for g > gflip.
(2) Case 1.2: When DAB < 1, the steady state (1; 1) is a sink for g < gflip, undergoes a ip
bifurcation at g = gflip, and becomes a saddle for g > gflip.
In Proposition 3, 1 <  < min
n
1 
 ,
1
1 
o
implies that max
n

1  ; (1  ) 
o
<  <  and
  1. As "l goes to +1,  converges to 1.5 Thus, local indeterminacy may occur with mild
externalities, i.e.,  < 1=2 and max
n

1  ; (1  ) 
o
<  < , and a large share of rst period
consumption over the after-tax wage income, i.e., 1=2 < . This is in contrast with the result in
Chen and Zhang (2009b), in which the share of rst period consumption over the after-tax wage
income to generate local indeterminacy should be less than 1/2. Moreover, Proposition 3 shows
that, for mild externalities, small government expenditures are helpful to local indeterminacy, while
large government expenditures are useful to stabilize the economy.
4. Capital income tax nance
In this section, we consider the case in which constant government expenditures are nanced by
capital income taxes, i.e., wt = 0 and g =  rtrtkt. The intertemporal competitive equilibrium paths
5Note that the supremum of s constraint tends to be 1 and the inmum tends to be max
n

1  ; 1  
o
, which is
less than 1.
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can be written as
kt+1 = (1  ( eRt+1))wtlt, (26-1)
v0(lt=B)lt=B = u1(1; h( eRt+1))wtlt, (26-2)
where eRt+1 = rt+1   g=kt+1, wt = bAkt l 1t , and rt = aAk 1t lt .
4.1. Steady state existence
A steady state is a pair
 
k; l

such that,
k =

1  (aAk 1l   g=k)

bAk

l

, (27-1)
v0(l=B)l=B = u1(1; h(aAk
 1
l
   g=k))bAkl. (27-2)
Again, we consider the NSS
 
k; l

= (1; 1). We have the following result.
Proposition 4. Let V (B) = v0(1=B)=B. Under Assumptions 1-2 and the assumption of gross
substitutability  > 1,
 
k; l

= (1; 1) is a normalized steady state (NSS) of the dynamic system
(26) if and only if limA!+1 (1  (aA  g)) bA > 1. The scaling parameters are set at the levels of
A > 0, B > 0 that satisfy the following equations:
1 = (1  (aA  g)) bA, (28-1)
B = V  1fu1[1; h(aA  g)]bAg. (28-2)
Proof. See Appendix 3.
Again, in the rest of Section 4, we assume that the conditions of Proposition 4 hold in order to
ensure the existence of the NSS.
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Assumption 5. limA!+1 (1  (aA  g)) bA > 1, A = A and B = B.
4.2. Local dynamics
Let us linearize the dynamical system (26) around the NSS. We can have the following result.
Proposition 5. The two-dimensional system (26) denes uniquely a local dynamics near the NSS
(k; l) = (1; 1). Let   1+"l"l > 1. The linearized dynamics for the deviations dkt = kt k, dlt = lt  l
are determined by the determinant DC and the trace TC of the Jacobian matrix. And the expressions
of DC and TC are given by
DC =



1
1    
b
a
g

, (29-1)
TC =

b
a
g   1
1  
 
   

( (   1) + 1)

+
(1  )
 (1  ) . (29-2)
Proof. See Appendix 4.
Depending on the degree of increasing returns to scale, local dynamics will be a¤ected by a change
in government expenditure. As before, we need gure out the range of g. Taking g = aAr into
Eq. (28-1) gives rise to 1 = bA [1  (aA (1  r))]. The homogeneity condition implies that  is
independent of aA  g. Thus, we have that A = [b (1  )] 1, which means that A is independent
of r and g =
ar
b(1 ) . Let g
max  a= [b (1  )]. Since r 2 (0; 1), the range of g is (0; gmax) under
the case with capital income taxes. Then we can have the following result.
Lemma 3. Let SC    1 

[( 1)+1] > 0. Then (TC ; DC) describes a half-line C as g goes from
0 to gmax,
DC = SCTC   SC(1  )
 (1  ) . (30)
Proof. Under the assumption  > 1, we have that

 [ (   1) + 1]    >  (   1) + 1    =
1   > 0, which implies that 0 < SC .
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Only one part of C is relevant as g 2 (0; gmax). First, we observe the starting and end points
of the pair (TC (g) ; DC (g)) in order to locate the half line C . It is easy to derive that
lim
g!0
DC = D
0 > 0, lim
g!0
TC = T
0,
lim
g!gmaxDC = 0, and T
m
C  limg!gmax TC = 
(1  )
 (1  ) < 0.
As a result, the relevant part of C describes a half-line which starts in
 
T 0; D0

for g = 0 and
points downwards to the left as g lies in (0; gmax). Again, we impose the same conditions: D0 < 1,
D0 > T 0 1, and D0 >  T 0 1. Similar to the analysis shown in Section 3, we require the following
restrictions:
1 <  <
1 + 

and 1 <


< min

1  

,
1
1  

.
These conditions imply that jTmC j = ( 1)(1 ) < (   1) < 1 and 0 < SC < 1, which in turn
implies that the whole half-line C lies inside the triangle ABC as g lies in (0; gmax). Therefore, when
 < 1 , 1 <  < 1+ and 1 <  < min
n
1 
 ,
1
1 
o
hold, the equilibrium paths are indeterminate
for g 2 (0; gmax).
We can summarize the local dynamics in the following proposition.
Proposition 6. Under Assumptions 1, 2, 4 and 5, when  < 1   , 1 <  < 1+ and 1 <  <
min
n
1 
 ,
1
1 
o
hold, as g goes up from 0 to gmax, (TC ; DC) moves from the point
 
T 0; D0

down-
wards to the left and stops in the TC axis. For any g 2 (0; gmax), the half-line C lies inside the
triangle ABC, and the economy always exhibits local indeterminacy.
In contrast to the case with labor income taxes, the dynamic system here only exhibits equilib-
rium indeterminacy and there do not exist ip/Hopf bifurcations. The local dynamics here are less
complicated than those in the former case. In other words, for any level of government expenditures
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nanced by capital income taxes, local indeterminacy always exists for mild externalities. In the case
with labor income taxes, local indeterminacy occurs only for small level of government expenditures.
Therefore, local indeterminacy occurs more easily in the case with capital income taxes.
5. Interpretation
5.1. The case with labor income taxes
To gain the insights behind the indeterminacy result, rst, let us consider the labor market. Following
Lloyd-Braga et al. (2007), it is easy to get the following equations:
rt+1dlt
ltdrt+1
=
1  
1="l   (1  ) gL ,
kt+1drt+1
rt+1dkt+1
=   1, lt+1drt+1
rt+1dlt+1
=  > 0.
For small values of government expenditures gL, we have that dltdrt+1
rt+1
lt
= 1 1="l (1 )gL > 0. When
we substitute rt+1 = aAk 1t+1 l

t+1 and wt = bAk

t l
 1
t into the system (17) and log-linearize it, simple
computations give rise to
(1  )blt+1 =M2blt +M3bkt, (31)
bkt+1 = blt (   1)
1   + M1
1  
1  

+ M1
1  
1  
bkt, (32)
where M1 = 1 + (1  ) gL, M2 =  [1 + (1  )  (   1)]   M1 [1  (1  ) (1  )], and M3 =
 M1 [1  (1  ) (1  )].
When the government expenditure gL is not large, we will have that   M1 > 0, M2 > 0 and
rt+1dlt
ltdrt+1
> 0 since = > 1. The expectations on an increase of the future real interest rate rt+1 will
lead to an increase of the labor supply lt since
rt+1dlt
ltdrt+1
> 0 and kt is predetermined. Hence an increase
in tomorrows capital stock kt+1 through Eq. (32) follows. In addition, M2 > 0 implies that the
rise in the current labor supply must be sustained by an increase in the future hours worked lt+1
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from Eq. (31). An increase in the capital stock kt+1 can decrease the real interest rate rt+1 since
kt+1drt+1
rt+1dkt+1
=    1 < 0. lt+1drt+1rt+1dlt+1 =  > 0 implies that an increase in the labor supply lt+1 will raise
the real interest rate rt+1. When the latter e¤ect dominates the former one, the expectations can be
self-fullling.
Notice that from (32), we have that
bkt+n+1   bkt+n = 1
1  
h
M4blt+n  M5bkt+ni  gL (   1) hblt+n + bkt+ni , (33)
withM4 =  (   1)  (   1) andM5 =  (   1)+(1  ) > 0. It is easy to nd thatM4 > 0
and M5 > 0 hold since = > 1 and 1   > .
First, suppose gL = 0. From Eq. (33), when the capital stock grows faster than hours worked at
time t+n, the deviation of the capital stock from the NSS will be reduced, which makes indeterminacy
occur. Now we consider the case: gL > 0. The introduction of government expenditures can instead
increase the deviation of the capital stock from its steady state since gL (   1) can be less than zero
(for instance,  = 1:1 and  = 0:51 as in Lloyd-Braga et al. (2007)). To summarize, indeterminacy
can arise for small value of government expenditures gL when the latter is nanced by labor income
taxes.6
5.2. The case with capital income taxes
In the case with capital income taxes, we can obtain the following derivatives
eRt+1dlt
ltd eRt+1 = (1  ) "l > 0,
kt+1d eRt+1eRt+1dkt+1 = reR   1  c1, lt+1drt+1rt+1dlt+1 = reR  c2 > 0.
6As the government expenditure gL is large, the deviation of the capital stock from the NSS will increase a lot,
which makes indeterminacy hard to arise.
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After we substitute eRt+1 = rt+1 g=kt+1 = aAk 1t+1 lt+1 g=kt+1 and wt = bAkt l 1t into the dynamic
system (26) and log-linearize it, simple computations give rise to
(1  ) c2blt+1 =M6blt +M7bkt, (34)
bkt+1 = 1  
1  
bkt +  1  
1   +
 (   1)
1  
blt, (35)
where M6 =      c1 [ (   1) +  (1  )] and M7 =   [1 + c1 (1  )].
For small values of gC , we have that c1 < 0, c2 > 0, and M6 > 0. The expectations on an
increase of the future real interest rate eRt+1 will lead to an increase of the current labor supply, since
eRt+1dlt
ltd eRt+1 = (1  ) "l > 0. Since kt+1 = (1  )wtlt, it follows a higher capital stock in the next period.
In addition, from Eq. (34), the rise in the current labor must be sustained by an increase in the
next period labor supply lt+1. Although an increase in the capital stock kt+1 can decrease the real
interest rate eRt+1 since kt+1d eRt+1eRt+1dkt+1 = r= eR  1 < 0, an increase in the labor supply lt+1 will raise the
real interest rate eRt+1 because lt+1drt+1rt+1dlt+1 = r= eR > 0. When the latter e¤ect dominates the former
one, expectations can be self-fullling.
But for large values of gC , we can have that c1 > 0, c2 > 0, and M6 < 0. c1 > 0 implies that the
after-tax real interest rate is increasing with respect to the capital stock. Therefore, an increase of
the labor supply lt can raise the future capital stock from Eq. (35), then increase the after-tax real
interest rate in the next period. However, M6 < 0 implies that the rise in the current labor must be
sustained by an decrease in the next period labor supply lt+1, which in turn decreases the after-tax
real interest rate. When the former e¤ect dominates the latter one, the after-tax real interest rate
in the next period can increase, and the expectations become self-fullling.
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Notice that
(1  )
hbkt+n+1   bkt+ni = [ (1  ) +  (   1)]blt+n   [ (   1) + (1  )]bkt+n. (36)
It is easy to nd that  (1  ) +  (   1) > 0 and  (   1) + (1  ) > 0 can hold when
= > 1 and  < 1. When the capital stock grows faster than the hours worked at time t+ n, the
deviation of the capital stock from the NSS will be reduced, which makes indeterminacy occur.
6. Constant income taxes
In previous sections, we consider that either labor or capital income tax rate is endogenously adjusted
to satisfy the budget constraint for a given value of government expenditure. In this section, we
consider another kind of scal policy specication in which government expenditure is endogenously
determined for xed tax rates on labor and capital income. Then the intertemporal competitive
equilibrium paths become
kt+1 = (1  ( eRt+1)) (1  w)wtlt, (37-1)
v0(lt=B)=B = u1(1; h( eRt+1)) (1  w)wt, (37-2)
where eRt+1 = 1   + (1   r) rt+1, wt = bAkt l 1t , rt = aAk 1t lt , and wwtlt +  rrtkt = gt.
As for the existence of the normalized steady state, we have the following result.
Proposition 7. Under Assumptions 1-2, let V (B) = v0(1=B)=B. Then
 
k; l

= (1; 1) is a normalized
steady state of the dynamic system (37) if and only if limA!+1 [1   (aA (1   r))] (1  w) bA > 1.
The scaling parameters A, B are set at the levels A > 0, B > 0 that satisfy the following
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equations:
1 = [1   (aA (1   r))] (1  w) bA, (38-1)
B = V  1fu1[1; h(aA (1   r))] (1  w) bA. (38-2)
Proof. See Appendix 5.
First, we assume that the conditions in Proposition 7 hold in order to ensure the existence of the
NSS in the rest of Section 6.
Assumption 6. limA!+1 [1   (aA (1   r))] (1  w) bA > 1, A = A and B = B.
Second, we linearize the dynamic system (37) around the NSS to study the local dynamics. After
tedious algebra, we can get
2664dkt+1
dlt+1
3775 =
26641 +  (1  ) (  1)  (1  )
(1  ) (  1)  (1  )
3775
 1 2664  
  1"l   (   1)
3775
2664dkt
dlt
3775 (39)
Moreover, the trace and the determinant can be written as follows
Tr =
1
(1  )

  + 1 + "l
"l
(1 +  (   1) (1  ))

, (40-1)
Det =
1 + "l
"l

(1  ) . (40-2)
From Eq. (40), we can nd that the trace and the determinant do not depend on the constant
labor and capital income tax rates. In other words, the stability of the NSS is not a¤ected by the
presence of constant labor and capital income tax rates. We can summarize these results as follows.
Proposition 8. Unlike the case of endogenous income taxes, the constant labor and capital income
tax rates have no impact on the range of values of increasing returns in production.
21
Therefore, we conclude that the local dynamic property is the same as that obtained in Lloyd-
Braga et al. (2007). In other words, the range of values of increasing returns is independent of the
constant tax rates on labor as well as capital income, when we consider an extended dynamic model
with consumptions in two periods and observe the relation between scal policy and the occurrence
of multiple equilibria. Guo and Lansing (2002) suggest that (in a Ramsey model) the minimum level
of increasing returns leading to indeterminacy is raised by increasing constant capital income tax
rate. But this property does not hold in the OLG framework.
7. Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we explore how both alternative government nancing methods and increasing returns
inuence aggregate uctuations driven by self-fullling expectations in an OLG model with con-
sumption in both periods of life, homothetic preferences and productive external e¤ects as studied
in Lloyd-Braga et al. (2007). We nd that (1) when constant government expenditures are nanced
by labor income taxes, local indeterminacy arises for small government expenditures and mild ex-
ternalities and; (2) when constant government expenditures are nanced by capital income taxes,
local indeterminacy always occurs for mild externalities. In addition, local indeterminacy in both
cases occurs under a large enough share of rst period consumption over the wage income. There-
fore, indeterminacy is more likely to occur if the government uses capital income taxes to nance its
expenditure. Moreover, we consider the case where government expenditure is endogenously deter-
mined for xed rates on labor and capital income under a balanced-budget rule. In contrast to the
previous results, we show that the constant tax rates on labor and capital income have no impact
on the range of values of increasing returns leading to local indeterminacy.
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Appendix:
A.1. Proof of Proposition 2
Let  = (1 + "l) ="l, and M1  1 + (1  ) g. Under the case with labor income taxes, the
linearization of Eq. (17) around the NSS is
2664dkt+1
dlt+1
3775 =
2664J11 J12
J21 J22
3775
2664dkt
dlt
3775 (A1)
where J11 =
(1 )M1
1  , J21 =
M1

(1 )(1 ) 1
1  , J12 =
(1 )M1
1   (1 )1  , and J22 = [(1 )(1 ) 1]M11   
(1 )(1 ) 1(1 ) .
A.2. Proof of Lemma 2
D0 < 1 requires that = < 1  < 1, or = < (1  ) =. Since = > 1, therefore 1  > 
holds. To ensure that
 
T 0; D0

lies inside the triangle ABC, we need that D0   T 0 + 1 > 0 and
D0+T 0+1 > 0. It is easy to get D0 T 0+1 = 1+( 1)1 
h

 (  1) + 1
i
. Therefore D0 T 0+1 > 0
holds if  <
1
1  . D
0 + T 0 + 1 = 
h
(1 +)
1  + 1 +


i
+ 1 
h

   1
i
holds. We assume that
1 <  < 1+ . Therefore, D
0+ T 0+1 > 0 holds since  > 1. When D
0 < 1,  > 12 , and 1 <  <
1+

hold,
SW  =  < 1 holds.
Thus, when
1 <  <
1 + 

and 1 <


< min

1  

,
1
1  

, (A2)
we can nd that D0 < 1, the point
 
T 0; D0

lies inside the triangle ABC and
SW  < 1.
A.3. Proof of Proposition 4
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If
 
k; l

= (1; 1) is a normalized steady state, the dynamic system (26) becomes
1 = (1  (aA  g)) bA, (A3)
v0(1=B)=B = u1[1; h(aA  g)]bA. (A4)
Since V 0 (B) < 0, V (B) = v0 (1=B) =B is invertible. aA   g = aA (1  k) > 0 holds since k 2
(0; 1) is the steady state capital income tax rate. Let G(A) = (1  (aA  g)) bA. We can easily
get G
0(A)A
G(A) = 1   (1   ) aAaA g , since 0
 eR eR=  eR = 1    eR1    eR where eR =
aA   g. With gross substitutability  > 1, G0(A)A=G(A) > 0 always holds. Since  2 (0; 1),
we have that limA!0 (1  (aA  g)) bA = 0. Then we can obtain a unique A > 0 from (A3) i¤
limA!+1 (1  (aA  g)) bA > 1. B > 0 can be easily derived from (A4) after the unique A is
pinned down.
A.4. Proof of Proposition 5
In the case with capital income taxes, linearizing Eq. (26) around the NSS yields
2664dkt+1
dlt+1
3775 =
26641 +
(1 )[a( 1)+(1 )bg]
a (1 )bg
a(1 )
a (1 )bg
 a( 1)+(1 )bga (1 )bg   a(1 )a (1 )bg
3775
 1

2664 
    
3775
2664dkt
dlt
3775 . (A5)
A.5. Proof of Proposition 7
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Let V (B) = v0 (1=B) =B. Assumption 1 implies that V 0 (B) < 0. Therefore, V (B) is invertible.
If
 
k; l

= (1; 1) is a normalized steady state, then system (37) becomes
1 = [1   (aA (1   r))] (1  w) bA  G (A) , (A6)
v0(1=B)=B = u1[1; h(aA (1   r))] (1  w) bA. (A7)
We can easily getG0(A)A=G(A) = 1 (1 ) > 0, since 0
 eR eR=  eR = 1    eR1    eR
where eR = aA (1   r). It follows that G(A) is monotonic with respect to A for any  > 0. For any
eR  0,   eR 2 (0; 1) holds. Therefore, we have that limA!0 [1  (aA (1   r))] (1  w) bA = 0.
There exists a unique A > 0 which satises (A6) i¤ limA!+1 [1   (aA (1   r))] (1  w) bA > 1.
B > 0 can be solved from (A7) after the unique A is pinned down.
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Tables and Figures
Figure 1. Labor income taxes: Case 1.1. The line W intersects the line AB and the segment BC,
both Hopf and ip bifurcations can occur.
Figure 2. Labor income taxes: Case 1.2. The line W intersects the line AB, only ip bifurcations
can occur.
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Figure 3. Capital income taxes.
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